Egypt & The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Introduction
Is the African Union (AU) the best hope for Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia to reach an agreement regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and could such an agreement serve as a foundation for future cooperation?
The construction of the GERD, located at the headwaters of the Blue Nile in Ethiopia, is nearing completion. To Egypt, the dam presents an existential threat. Even so, negotiations between Ethiopia and the downstream states of the Blue Nile delta have remained in a state of limbo despite attempts by the United States to intervene on Egypt’s behalf. On October 23rd of this year, President Donald Trump channeled Egypt’s concerns with a certain brevity and directness by suggesting that Egypt might ‘blow up’ the dam[1]. In addition to the threat posed by the dam itself in the region, it is expected that climate change will result in a temperature rise from 1.8 to 3.6 degrees Celsius over next century[2], make drought seasons longer and more frequent, and cause evaporation levels along the Nile to increase[3].
Significance
Dam projects at the headwaters of major rivers often result in diplomatic conflicts between upstream and downstream states. Additionally, these disagreements often entail highly unequal power dynamics, with capital investments on the part of the more capital-rich, upstream state being made at the expense of the downstream state. For instance, southeast Asian states have suffered the effects of reduced flows in the Mekong river during drought, which were spurred by the numerous dams China has constructed at its headwaters (See Exhibit A). Additionally, Iraq experienced increased rates of desertification and Syria experienced agricultural losses that likely contributed to the Syrian Civil War, both as direct results of Turkish dam projects on the upper Tigris and Euphrates[4].
Unlike the power dynamics along the Tigris, Euphrates, and Mekong rivers, power on the Nile river is concentrated downstream, in Egypt. Because Egypt is a strategic ally in the region, the United States agreed to help mediate the discussions. The failure of US diplomacy in this case is consistent with the pattern of unsolved disagreements between upstream and downstream states of major rivers associated with large dam projects at their headwaters. However, Egypt and Ethiopia are a unique case. Both are members of the African Union, which has shown potential as a diplomatic forum for multilateral cooperation. At this point, the AU is Egypt’s best hope for reaching an amicable agreement with Ethiopia on the GERD.
The first section of the following analysis will summarize the GERD negotiations so far, while the next two sections will serve to outline the implications of the GERD within the distinct contexts of the two major players in the crisis: Egypt and Ethiopia. The last section is intended to highlight how the AU has served as a forum for successful cooperation between African nations in the past, with specific reference to Ethiopia.
Analysis
I. Background
Negotiations surrounding the dam began almost a decade ago. Since then, very little has been achieved apart from the 2015 “Agreement on Declaration of Principles” signed by Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia to govern negotiations[7]. In February of this year, the United States proposed an agreement designed to govern the operation of the dam while ensuring Egypt’s supposed right to the “natural flow” of the Nile river. Egypt signed the agreement, but Ethiopia rejected it. In response, the United States cut Ethiopia off from “$264 million in security and development assistance[2].” Two rounds of negotiations have occurred since, both with the AU in attendance. However, these negotiations failed, and by July Ethiopia had begun filling the GERD’s massive reservoir. Despite this, on August 25th, the three countries of the Blue Nile delta “returned to talks under African Union mediation,” pledging to “push for a deal[5].” In a joint statement released by Egypt and Ethiopia, they praised “African solutions to African problems,” and noted that such a deal could serve as “a tool for regional integration.”
II. Ethiopia’s Future
Once completed, the GERD will be the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa — at a cost of $4 billion[2]. For Ethiopia, the benefits of this project will be enormous, as its economic growth has been “stifled by a lack of electricity[1].” The GERD promises to power much of the country and “set the country on a path to industrialization that could lift tens of millions out of poverty.” Once the dam is completed, it will power “5,700 foreign companies” while providing reliable electricity to most of Ethiopia’s 100 million citizens, 80% of which reside in rural areas. The GERD “will also help with similar problems in Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti, all of which are connected to Ethiopia’s grid and will begin importing power from it in the coming years.” Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s position as an “imperfect hegemon” in the Horn of Africa could be further cemented[6].
It is also notable that while Ethiopia is a water-rich country, its underdeveloped irrigation systems have made much of the country highly susceptible to intermittent droughts, as rainfall in the region is highly seasonal[3]. The famine that occurred from 1983–1985 was the direct result of such a drought. It is likely that the memory of this experience has informed much of Ethiopia’s behavior in the negotiations. Ethiopia intends to use the reservoir of the GERD, in conjunction with the reservoirs of other planned dam projects, to irrigate farms across the country. In doing so, agricultural yields will increase in lockstep with a massive reduction in water insecurity.
III. Egypt’s Future
As a riparian country[7], the vast majority of Egypt’s population is concentrated along the banks of the Nile. Egypt “is essentially a desert oasis of 100 million people.” relying on the Nile “for more than 90% of its scarce fresh water supplies[5].” Even so, the High Aswan Dam would likely enable Egypt to mitigate the negative effects of a drought, as it has in the past[8].
Climate change will force Egypt to modernize its agricultural sector. For example, “two years ago, Egypt reduced the area used for rice production by more than a half, from 1.76 million acres to 750,000, in an effort to save 3 billion cubic meters of water[2].” Much of Egypt’s population still relies on agriculture for their livelihoods, despite the country’s otherwise reasonable level of development. Egypt would have to face this problem regardless of the GERD, but this has not stopped its politicians from trying to pass the buck by delegating the responsibility of water management to Ethiopia.
IV. AU Cooperation: Local Precedent
Under the auspices of the AU, multilateral efforts have already been undertaken in regions adjacent to the Nile delta, with Ethiopia as a key participant. For example, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has largely been successful in achieving peacekeeping goals in the country, more so than the earlier unilateral efforts of the United States[9]. Deployed to Mogadishu in 2007, the ultimate goal of the mission has been to subdue the local terrorist organization known as Al-Shabaab, which is largely responsible for persistent instability in the region. While the exact degree of success regarding this ultimate goal is disputed, the scope of the mission has since expanded, as AMISOM has taken on the additional responsibilities pertaining to the facilitation of political development, humanitarian assistance, and the bolstering of local security forces. Ethiopia is an important player in AMISOM, which comes as no surprise. Ethiopia is the official host of the AU, contains more than one million ethnic Somalis[10], and occupies 1,019 miles of Somalia’s 1,482-mile-long land border[11]. Apart from Ethiopia, the mission includes contributions from Djibouti, Kenya, Burundi, Uganda, Ghana, Zambia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone[12]. The success of this broad, multilateral arrangement serves to highlight the potential of the AU as a forum for increased cooperation between African states.
Conclusion
It is promising that instead of trying to reach a broad, legally-binding agreement on water flows with Ethiopia, Egypt has conceded — now pursuing a single technical agreement on GERD filling and operation[7]. However, even if no agreement were reached, “Egypt and Ethiopia [would] still need to cooperate on logistical issues on an ad hoc basis in order to manage the flow of water between releases at the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Egypt’s Aswan High Dam[3].” Considering the fact that climate change is also a shared threat, the states of the Blue Nile delta should focus on the potential benefits of increased regional integration, and work toward more ambitious cooperative arrangements through the AU.
Recommendations
- A cooperative trade agreement will enable the agricultural benefits of the GERD to be shared among the states in the Nile Delta region, countering any food insecurity that might otherwise result from climate change.
- An expanded, regional electrical grid will facilitate the transition to more reliable, renewable sources of energy and contribute to regional economic growth.
- A regional security arrangement will allow regional players to better address persistent instability in Sudan, which will only be worsened by climate change.
- An amicable agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia will serve as a baseline for any future AU negotiations regarding dam projects further upstream on the White Nile.
Appendix
Exhibit A:
Endnotes
[1] Washington (AFP). (2020, October 23). Trump suggests Egypt may ‘blow up’ Ethiopia dam. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20201023-trump-suggests-egypt-may-blow-up-ethiopia-dam
[2] Bearak, Max, & Raghavan, Sudarsan. (2020, October 15). Africa’s largest dam powers dreams of prosperity in Ethiopia — and fears of hunger in Egypt. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2020/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-egypt-nile/
[3] Stratfor. (2020, December 2). Egypt’s Losing Battle on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Stratfor Analysis.
[4] Dilleen, Connor. (2019, November 6). Turkey’s Dam-Building Could Create New Middle East Conflict. The Maritime Executive. https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/turkey-s-dam-building-could-create-new-middle-east-conflict#:~:text=Twenty%2Dtwo%20dams%20are%20slated,supplies%20in%20Turkey's%20southern%20neighbours.
[5] Reuters Staff. (2020, August 25). Sudan and Ethiopia pledge to push for deal on Blue Nile dam. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-dam-sudan/sudan-and-ethiopia-pledge-to-push-for-deal-on-blue-nile-dam-idUSKBN25L24D
[6] Gouriellec, Sonia. (2018). “Regional power and contested hierarchy: Ethiopia, an ‘imperfect hegemon’ in the Horn of Africa”. International Affairs, 94(5): 1059–1075.
[7] Helal, Mohamed S. (2020, September 28). Ethiopia’s Power Play on the Nile Has Left the Region in a Deadlock. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/28/renaissance-dam-ethiopia-egypt-negotiations/
[8] Ethiopia Insight. (2020, April 2). Why Ethiopia rejected the U.S.-drafted GERD deal. Ethiopia Insight. https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/04/02/why-ethiopia-rejected-the-u-s-drafted-gerd-deal/
[9] Williams, Paul. (2018). “Subduing Al-Shabab: The Somalia Model of Counterterrorism and Its Limits”. The Washington Quarterly, 41(2): 95–111.
[10] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. (1993, May 1). Somalia: Information on Somalis in Ethiopia, ETH14240. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6abd463.html
[11] Kiprop, Joseph. (2018, November 26). Which Countries Border Somalia? World Atlas. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/which-countries-border-somalia.html#:~:text=Somalia%20covers%20an%20area%20of,Kenya%2C%20Djibouti%2C%20and%20Ethiopia.
[12] AMISOM Military Component. AMISOM. https://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/
